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Comment 
Assuring Continuity of Government 
SANFORD LEVINSON* 
I am a great admirer of Seth Barrett Tillman’s work.  There are few 
people who are so interested in, and knowledgeable about, the conse-
quences of what most people unfortunately dismiss as the minutiae of con-
stitutional procedure.1  The problem he has now turned his attention to – 
how to assure a functioning Congress in case of catastrophic disasters – is 
extremely important, and his model statute provides the basis for what 
should be a continuing conversation.2 
Tillman is not the first person to “spot the issue,” as it were.  Thus, a 
joint commission created by the conservative American Enterprise Institute 
and the liberal Brookings Institution (“AEI-Brookings Commission”), was 
formed to address the issue of continuity in government following such 
disasters and published in 2003 a report aptly titled Preserving Our Institu-
tions.3  Furthermore, Yale Law School professor Bruce Ackerman devotes 
a chapter vividly titled “If Washington Blows Up?” in his recently pub-
lished book, Before the Next Attack, to the issue of continuity in govern-
ment,4 and I engage the subject as well in a forthcoming book.5  Addition-
ally, Texas Senator John Cornyn6 has proposed a constitutional amendment 
to deal with aspects of the problem, though serious consideration of the 
amendment has been stymied by a mixture of the relative “unsexiness” of 
the issue, in today’s sound-bite and polarized polity, and the recalcitrance 
  
 * W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Centennial Chair in Law, University of 
Texas Law School, Professor of Government, University of Texas at Austin. 
 1. See e.g. Seth Barrett Tillman, A Textualist Defense of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3, 83  
Tex. L. Rev. 1373 (2005). 
 2. Seth Barrett Tillman, Model Continuity of Congress Statute, 4 Pierce L. Rev. 191 (2006) [here-
inafter Model Statute]. 
 3. Continuity of Government Commission, Preserving Our Institutions – The First Report of the 
Continuity of Government Commission, http://www.continuityofgovernment.org/pdfs/FirstReport.pdf 
(June 4, 2003). 
 4. Bruce Ackerman, Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil Liberties in An Age of Terrorism 
(Yale U. Press 2006). 
 5. Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution: Where the Constitution Goes Wrong (and 
How We the People Can Correct It) (Oxford U. Press, forthcoming 2006). 
 6. Senator Cornyn has represented Texas from December 2, 2002 to present.  Biography of U.S. 
Senator John Cornyn, http://cornyn.senate.gov/doc_archive/biography.pdf (accessed May 22, 2006). 
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of Representative James Sensenbrenner,7 the Republican chair of the 
House Judiciary Committee, who, to adopt retired United States Senator 
Alan K. Simpson’s8 language, has “rudely” refused even to hold hearings 
on the amendment.9   
What makes Tillman’s proposal distinctive, and important, is that it 
presents a statutory solution to at least aspects of the problem.  It is an au-
dacious proposal well worth discussing at greater length than I have time 
for in preparing this brief comment.  Before turning to the specifics of his 
proposal, though, it is worth spelling out the possible situation that under-
lies the concern displayed by an increasing number of thoughtful Ameri-
cans about the issue of continuity in government.  Consider, then, the fol-
lowing dilemma that could face us “the day after” a catastrophic disaster 
(most likely a terrorist attack). 
Imagine that United Airlines flight 93 had in fact crashed into the 
United States Capitol, as apparently was the intention of the hijackers, and 
killed or disabled, say, 400 members of the House of Representatives and 
disabled, say, eighty senators.  Note carefully the lack of parallelism in the 
preceding sentence.  If eighty senators were killed, that would obviously be 
a catastrophe, but one from which the country, as a formal matter, could 
quickly recover.  The reason is the Seventeenth Amendment, which allows 
state governors immediately to fill any Senate seat that becomes vacant.10  
So, as a formal matter, the Senate could be back up to its full strength of 
one hundred within a very few days.  The problem, so far as the Senate is 
concerned, is not with dead senators, but, rather, with significantly dis-
abled ones.  They would, presumably, retain their seats, as a formal matter, 
even though, by definition, they would be unable actually to show up and 
do the legislative work. 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment, proposed and ratified in the wake of 
John F. Kennedy’s assassination, addresses the possibility of a disabled 
President and provides a careful procedure by which the incumbent can be 
relieved, temporarily or permanently, of the office in favor of his or her 
replacement, the person next in line, who will usually be the Vice Presi-
dent.11  No such procedure is available with regard to disabled senators.  
  
 7. Representative Sensenbrenner has represented Wisconsin’s 5th District from January 1979 to 
present.  Biography of Congressman James Sensenbrenner, http://www.house.gov/sensenbrenner/ 
bio.htm (accessed May 22, 2006). 
 8. Senator Simpson served his constituents in Wyoming from 1978 to 1997.  Biographical Direc-
tory of the U.S. Cong., http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=S000429 (accessed 
May 22, 2006). 
 9. See Sen. Comm. on the Jud., Ensuring the Continuity of the United States Government: A Pro-
posed Constitutional Amendment to Guarantee a Functioning Congress, 108th Cong. 9 (Jan. 27, 2004). 
 10. See U.S. Const. amend. XVII. 
 11. See U.S. Const. amend. XXV, § 1. 
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One consequence, as a technical matter, is the possible inability of the Sen-
ate to achieve a legal quorum, which is a majority of the (living) member-
ship.  Should fifty-one senators be in comas or otherwise disabled in hospi-
tals, the Senate would be barred from meeting, at least if one is a textual 
purist.  After all, Article 1, Section 5, Clause 1 explicitly states that “a Ma-
jority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business.”12  A similar prob-
lem would be presented if hundreds of representatives were disabled.  This 
possibility of disabled members of Congress, unable to function but whose 
existence would make impossible the legal functioning of either house of 
Congress under present quorum rules – a majority of their respective 
members – has sparked the concern for appropriate change.   
Ironically, either house can always achieve a quorum even if it has 
been ravaged by a catastrophic attack that kills most of its members.  Even 
if only three members survive, two of them would constitute a quorum of 
the living members.  The problem in that instance is not formal, but, rather, 
political.  No serious person could regard the decisions made by such a 
“rump” House or Senate as politically legitimate.  As already noted, the 
Senate would be quickly reconstituted following a devastating attack, so 
there is no practical possibility of having to suffer the consequences of a 
three-person (or even sixty-person) Senate for more than a day or two.  The 
House presents a far more serious problem, given that Article I, Section 2, 
Clause 4, also provides that “When vacancies happen in the Representation 
from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Elec-
tion to fill such Vacancies,”13 which clearly suggests that election is the 
exclusive path to membership in the House.  
From this insight arises the proposal by the AEI-Brookings Commis-
sion that the Constitution be amended to provide a quick succession, simi-
lar to that available for the Senate, should a disaster wipe out hundreds of 
members of the House.14  Proposals range from the election or designation 
of “vice Representatives” who would automatically take over in case of 
disability or death to allowing gubernatorial appointment of replacements 
for representatives in precisely the same way that the Seventeenth Amend-
ment made possible for the Senate.15  Bruce Ackerman has joined Tillman 
in offering a statutory proposal: Ackerman’s proposal would require the 
election of “vice Representatives” at the same time as the general election 
of members of the House.16  Presumably living well outside of Washing-
  
 12. U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. 
 13. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 4 (emphasis added). 
 14. Continuity of Government Commission, supra n. 3. 
 15. Id. at 28-29. 
 16. See Ackerman, supra n. 4, at 147-53. 
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ton, these vice Representatives would be able to take office very quickly 
following a catastrophic attack that killed hundreds of representatives.17 
As already noted, the proposed constitutional amendment sponsored by 
Senator Cornyn, which offers the possibility of a comprehensive solution, 
is, at least at this time (April 2006) going nowhere.18  Congress is fiddling 
even against the possibility that Rome could potentially burn up.  This is 
where the Tillman proposal comes in.  He audaciously advocates that Con-
gress pass a framework statute that in effect delegates to one house of Con-
gress the power to pass binding legislation, at least for ninety days, if the 
other house is unable to achieve a quorum.19  Tillman recognizes the 
anomaly that either house could always have a quorum, even of only two 
members, if they are the only remaining living members.  He addresses this 
by setting a floor of forty members of the House (who could represent a 
majority of seventy-nine living members) and twenty members of the Sen-
ate (out of a maximum of thirty-nine members) in order to constitute a 
legal quorum.20   
Tillman recognizes that the proposal raises fascinating constitutional 
questions about the ability in effect to suspend our bicameral legislative 
system for a unicameral one, though, of course, the President would be a 
vital participant in both proposing and then signing legislation.21  He is not, 
that is, suggesting a fully parliamentary system, even for a single day.   
Not only bedrock constitutional structures of bicameralism, but also 
the Chadha case,22 seemingly defeat his proposal.  As to Chadha, he sim-
ply states that it is “not controlling.”23  I have no objection to that move.  I 
am not a fan of the initial decision, and he makes a powerful case, simply 
by drafting the statute, that it is potentially absurd to stand on formal cere-
mony in the face of catastrophic events that call into question the capacity 
of the United States to continue governing itself through relatively democ-
ratic institutions.  Surely it is better that we have one legislative house in 
action, able to deliberate and pass (or reject) presidential proposals, rather 
than, in effect, to dismiss the very possibility of any legislative participa-
tion because of the inability to meet the bicameralism requirement if one 
house is lacking a quorum.  To insist on formal purity is in effect to wel-
come a presidential dictatorship, because the one thing that is unthinkable 
  
 17. Id.  Ackerman’s proposal, however, does not speak to the problem of the disabled representa-
tive. 
 18. See supra n. 9 and accompanying text. 
 19. Model Statute, supra n. 2, at 192. 
 20. Id. at 196. 
 21. Id. at 194. 
 22. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 23. Model Statute, supra n. 2, at 191. 
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is that the Chief Executive would refrain from issuing fiat “legislation” 
while waiting months for both of the houses to reconstitute themselves.   
As already noted, Tillman’s proposal would almost certainly eventuate 
in legislative rule by the Senate.  Given the Seventeenth Amendment, so 
long as senators are killed instead of being disabled, there will almost al-
ways be not only a “Tillmanian” quorum of twenty, but also, significantly, 
a far higher number of senators available to meet.  Governors would pre-
sumably move with alacrity to fill the vacant seats.  A truly ravaged House, 
on the other hand, would be unable to meet even the modest Tillmanian 
quorum inasmuch as there is currently no procedure, save new elections, to 
fill House vacancies.  But let us assume a House that indeed now consists 
only of forty members, with the remaining 395 having lost their lives in the 
catastrophic attack.  There is no good reason to believe that such a rump 
House would be viewed as legitimate, especially if the forty survivors were 
overwhelmingly from one political party or one region of the country.  The 
Senate, for all of its problems, including what I regard as the ludicrous 
principle of equal voting power that gives Wyoming or Vermont the same 
number of senators as California or Texas, is nonetheless far more likely to 
bounce back to relatively full strength and reflect the political and regional 
diversity of the country.   
Thus I am inclined to require a far higher number than forty in order to 
legitimate the House as a co-participant in governance.  I would prefer that 
at least one hundred representatives, from a cross-section of our vast coun-
try, be available.  So long as one is thinking audaciously, which Tillman 
invites us to do, perhaps the solution to what might be termed a “subquo-
rum House” is to “fold” these members of the House into the Senate and 
create a larger, quite possibly more representative, body that will serve as 
our “unicameral legislature” during the period of emergency or until the 
House reaches the proper number for a quorum.  It is not unlikely, though, 
that Tillman would (properly) respond that such a proposal, unlike his 
own, would require an enabling amendment to the Constitution, whereas 
the value of his proposal, as already emphasized, is that it avoids that 
slough of despond.  That may, of course, be correct. 
In any event, whether or not Seth Barrett Tillman has delivered the 
“last word” on what a framework statute should look like, which is almost 
certainly not the case, he has given us a very valuable first cut at a precise 
delineation of what might work to preserve our “Republican Form of Gov-
ernment” even under extreme conditions.  This is a signal act of good citi-
zenship, as well as of careful lawyering.  I hope that his proposal gets the 
attention that it deserves.   
